PAKISTAN is an active member of the UN, with a track record of supporting the peaceful resolution of conflicts worldwide. Just recently, Pakistan called for the implementation of the UN Security Council’s latest resolution, which demands the withdrawal of Rwandan-backed M23 rebels from the Democratic Republic of Congo while encouraging diplomatic talks between DRC and Rwanda.

Asim Iftikhar Ahmad, who is Pakistan’s permanent representative-designate to the UN, stated that it was “evident that there is no military solution to this conflict”.

His stance reflects a positive, rational approach, and emphasises the need for a political solution rather than military confrontation. However, while Pakistan backs a peaceful resolution to international conflicts, its counterinsurgency approach at home has often been militarised, and has thus presented a contrast between its global and internal strategies. A nation’s moral and political credibility gets a boost when its international commitments align with effective and fair domestic practices.

Apart from the political ethics of international diplomacy, Pakistan can see a familiar pattern in its own case, ie, the role of neighbouring countries is crucial to resolving internal conflicts. In most cases, insurgents receive external support from neighbouring states, which may have various justifications for their involvement. However, a stable and cooperative neighbourhood ultimately facilitates conflict resolution, as most insurgencies emerge and operate near international borders.

Given the presence of militants in the border areas, securing regional cooperation is essential.

The most effective counterinsurgency (COIN) strategies acknowledge this reality and seek regional cooperation to isolate and weaken insurgents. If a state’s relations with its neighbours are strained and lack the political capital to secure its support, the conflict is likely to persist. This can be seen in the ongoing tensions between DRC and Rwanda.

Pakistan’s COIN challenges are not unique or unprecedented, and a parallel can be drawn with Colombia, whose neighbouring countries — Venezuela, Ecuador, and, to some extent, Brazil — provided varying degrees of support to leftist insurgent groups like the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army.

Colombia secured international backing, especially from America, which launched Plan Colombia (1999-2016) to provide military and economic assistance as well as counter-narcotics support. However, Colombia’s COIN efforts only achieved real success when the country earned the cooperation of its neighbours, including Venezuela, which ultimately played a diplomatic role in peace talks with FARC, though this was not an easy process. Pakistan is seeking similar external support from China, but military operations alone may not bring lasting peace without regional cooperation.

Other South Asian countries have also prioritised engaging neighbouring states to combat insurgencies: India improved its ties with Bangladesh, which led to Dhaka cracking down on the northeast insurgent groups. Sri Lanka secured international backing (or at least a neutral posture) from China, Russia, and Pakistan while countering Western pressure over human rights concerns during its decisive military offensive against the Tamil Tigers.

Pakistan has previously leveraged diplomatic and regional alliances in its own COIN efforts, as it did in the 1970s in its campaign against the Baloch insurgency. It received critical support from Iran in its counterinsurgency campaign against the Baloch insurgency.

In contrast, though, Pakistan quite actively supported the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan, providing the insurgents with material aid and diplomatic facilitation, particularly with the US and Nato, ultimately contributing to the Taliban’s victory and America’s exit from the country. Many experts are of the opinion that if Pakistan and Iran had not supported the Taliban insurgency, its success would have been far less likely. Pakistan used both military and diplomatic channels to ensure the Taliban’s survival and ultimately its takeover of Kabul, demonstrating how a mix of regional support and global diplomacy can shape an insurgency’s outcome. Given Pakistan’s first-hand experience of leveraging regional support to counter or contain insurgencies, why is it not applying a similar approach to its own COIN efforts?

With long borders and the presence of insurgents across them, securing regional cooperation should be a strategic priority. However, applying the same strategy domestically can be politically complex, despite knowing the consequences of neglecting regional engagement.

Pakistan has successfully established that Afghanistan is a major sponsor of terrorism within its borders, while Baloch insurgents are known to have been using Iranian territory as a sanctuary. However, it has not effectively leveraged its diplomatic skills to engage both countries in its COIN strategy.

While the Taliban’s reactive mindset is understood well, Pakistan still has significant leverage over them. Instead of relying primarily on coercive measures, a balanced approach that combines diplomatic, political and economic incentives could be more effective in persuading the Taliban to take concrete actions against groups planning and launching cross-border attacks from Afghan soil.

In Iran’s case, there is a pressing need to reassess the existing border management mechanisms, as they have failed to address the insurgency on both sides, illegal crossings, smuggling, and drug trafficking. While deeper engagement with Iran could provoke concerns in Washington and Riyadh, Pakistan cannot effectively tackle religiously motivated terrorism and the Baloch insurgency without stronger COIN collaboration with its neighbours.

Pakistan must revaluate its broader strategic and political paradigm, prioritising regional cooperation over external alignments to ensure long-term security and stability. A successful COIN strategy requires more than military action; it demands a comprehensive regional approach, diplomatic engagement, and internal political will to align its international positions with its domestic counterinsurgency efforts.

As Pakistan is a campaigner for the peaceful resolution of conflicts on the international stage, one expects it to use the same approach to resolve its internal conflicts. Apart from cultivating safer neighbourhoods, engaging with the local communities is as essential as the military component to defeat the insurgency. There is no doubt that the security challenge is complex in Balochistan, but relying only on coercive measures and reducing space for political activities will only prolong the conflict.

The writer is a security analyst.

Published in Dawn, March 30th, 2025